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The influence of management structure on the performance of Fund of Funds  
 
Abstract 
 
A rapidly growing mutual fund category is Fund of Funds (FOFs), which invest in 
other mutual funds instead of individual securities.  This study reports on FOFs’ 
characteristics and performance relative to traditional equity mutual funds and finds 
that FOFs compare favorably.  In particular, FOFs with identified managers 
outperform their unidentified counterparts, and FOFs that invest in-family outperform 
both traditional equity funds and those FOFs investing out-of-family.  Finally, 
replicating FOFs’ holdings can be prohibitively expensive since they commonly hold 
funds with high minimum initial investments, closed funds and/or funds that are 
restricted to a particular investor type. 
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The influence of management structure on the performance of Fund of Funds  
 
1.  Introduction 
Over the past decade the mutual fund industry has experienced rapid growth in a 
category of mutual funds known as Funds of Funds (FOFs).  These funds distinguish 
themselves by investing in shares of other mutual funds rather than buying individual 
securities, thus providing a unique opportunity to examine several relevant issues 
regarding mutual fund management, services and performance.  In particular, this 
paper analyzes the characteristics of FOFs to determine whether or not they provide 
significant investor benefits including enhanced performance due to management 
expertise and/or better risk return trade-offs than traditional mutual funds.  We also 
discuss the feasibility and cost of replicating a FOFs’ portfolio strategy.1   
 
In addition to offering the same advantages as traditional mutual funds, FOFs offer 
instant diversification across different fund companies and managers.  FOFs expand 
investment opportunities by providing a mechanism for investing in those traditional 
funds with high minimum initial investments and funds that are closed, as well as 
funds that might otherwise be restricted to a specific investor type (i.e. institutional 
investors).  In terms of management expertise, FOFs enable investors to access 
foreign funds and create portfolios of top-quality managers whereby investors gain 
from embedded and affordable advice.  Managers also have greater flexibility in 
reacting to changing market conditions due to the unique composition of FOFs.  
Finally, when an investor selects a FOFs the individual fund selection dilemma is 
easily resolved. 
                                                 
1  The term ‘fund of funds’ is frequently used to describe hedge fund activity and investing in funds of 
hedge funds.  This paper does not include an analysis of these fund types. 
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Alternatively, FOFs potentially involve certain costs and create other disadvantages to 
the investing public.  For instance, the process of investing in FOFs necessarily adds 
another layer of fees and expenses, and with traditional mutual funds already under 
fire for excessive costs, FOFs may be seen as prohibitively expensive.  Additionally, 
the diversification advantage across fund companies and managers diminishes when 
FOFs invest in only one fund or within one family of funds.  In such cases FOFs are 
seen as more of a marketing tool for the fund family thus proliferating their offerings 
in an attempt to keep business in-house.  Conversely, FOFs may argue that their 
knowledge of in-house managers, in comparison to lesser known outsiders, enhances 
their ability to find top performers.   
 
This paper will address these competing arguments by analyzing the performance and 
other basic characteristics of FOFs.  In doing so, we first present the overall 
descriptive statistics for a sample of FOFs in comparison to traditional mutual funds 
and then summarize the relevant risk-adjusted performance data for these funds.  
Further analyses within the FOFs’ sample consider the impact of diversification, 
management expertise and expenses on FOFs’ performance.  Given the rapid growth 
and apparent significant benefits for this category of funds, our analyses may shed 
some light on whether FOFs’ popularity is justified. 
 
Our results suggest that FOFs do offer diversification benefits to investors at both the 
fund company and manager level, and FOFs perform as well as, and in some cases 
better than traditional equity mutual funds with similar investment objectives. 
Management expertise influences performance since FOFs with identified team 
managers perform better than those FOFs with unidentified teams.  In addition, in-
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family FOFs outperform those investing out-of-family and also the traditional equity 
funds.  Finally, based on the inaccessibility of closed funds and funds with large 
minimum initial investments, FOFs provide an investment vehicle, which cannot be 
replicated.  
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides a review of the 
literature and a discussion of growth trends in the mutual fund market.  Section 3 
presents the descriptive statistics of the FOFs’ sample and two different equity fund 
samples.  Section 4 defines the measures used for evaluating the impact of 
management and the effect of in-family versus out-of-family diversification on fund 
performance.  Section 5 presents a summary of results and conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review and market trends 
Prior literature on traditional mutual fund performance is quite extensive beginning 
with the early works of Treynor (1965), Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968), which 
suggest that mutual funds don’t beat the market.  In providing a summary of the early 
performance related mutual fund literature, Ippolito (1993), by contrast, reaches the 
opposite conclusion.  More recent studies continue to examine performance by 
analyzing the impact of costs (fees, turnover and expense ratios) and other mutual 
fund characteristics with findings that frequently contradict one another.2  To explain 
these contradictory results, other studies such as Lehman and Modest (1987), 
Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross (1992), Elton, 
                                                 
2  Malkiel (1993, 1995) and Carhart (1997) document a negative impact for portfolio turnover and total 
fund expenses, while Grinblatt and Titman (1994) and Wermers (2000) find a positive relationship 
between performance and turnover.  In another study, Hooks (1996) concludes that low expense load 
funds outperform average expense no-load funds, while Droms and Walker (1996) find no relation 
between performance and loads.  Considering a number of performance factors, Prather, Bertin and 
Henker (2004) find expenses to be negatively related to performance and no relation between turnover 
and performance.   
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Gruber, Das, and Hlavka (1993), Grinblatt and Titman (1994), Malkiel (1995), Golec 
(1996), Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1996), Carhart (1997), Detzel and Weigand (1998), 
and Dellva, DeMaskey, and Smith (2001) attribute abnormal performance and 
persistence to the overstatement of returns resulting from survivorship bias and 
misspecification due to benchmark error.   
 
The latest studies continue the performance discussion by considering a variety of 
fund and management specific features such as industry concentration, management 
structure, family cross-subsidization, mimicking top performing funds and market 
timing.3  Brown, Goetzmann and Liang (2004) examine funds of hedge funds citing 
some of the same potential advantages/disadvantages as noted above for FOFs.  They 
find that the additional fees including high incentive fees leave funds of hedge funds 
with worse performance records than individual hedge funds.  Although their hedge 
fund study is related, no prior mutual fund studies have systematically analyzed FOFs 
(funds that invest in traditional mutual funds).  In addition to being the first 
examination of FOFs, our study contributes to the existing literature by comparing 
FOFs’ performance relative to a sample of traditional equity mutual funds as well as 
to the overall market. We also analyze FOFs’ performance in terms of fund 
management structure and provide a systematic approach for selecting the best FOFs. 
 
2.1. FOFs growth trends 
In 1996 Morningstar Principia Mutual Funds Advanced (MS) reported performance 
information for 55 multi-class equity FOFs.4  These funds were offered by 17 fund 
                                                 
3  See, for example, Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005), Bär, Kempf and Ruenzi (2005), Gaspar, 
Massa and Matos (2006), Cohen, Coval and Pástor (2005) and Friesen and Sapp (2007). 
4 Equity funds refer to the MS categorization of domestic and international equity funds.  Multi-class 
funds hold the same investment portfolio across each class, but offer different shareholder rights and 
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families and accounted for approximately $14.65 billion in mutual fund assets.  At the 
end of 2003, the number of FOFs had grown to 526 offerings from 67 fund families 
with FOFs’ assets totalling approximately $85.32 billion.  This represents a 28.6% 
annual growth rate in FOFs’ assets over this seven-year period.  In comparison, the 
number of multi-class equity funds across the same investment objective categories as 
the FOFs increased from 2,138 to 6,492 (with assets increasing from $1.14 trillion to 
$2.50 trillion) over the 1996-2003 period.  This represents an 11.87% annual growth 
rate in assets, which is less than half that of the FOFs over the same period.   
 
When compared to similarly classified equity funds, FOFs in 1996 accounted for 
approximately 1.3% of total mutual fund assets, but by the end of 2003 this proportion 
had grown to 3.4%.  Several factors may be responsible for such an increase including 
performance and performance-related demand among investors resulting in an 
increased flow of funds.  Additionally, as mutual fund companies attempt to meet 
increased demand, they may initiate new or expand upon existing FOFs’ offerings (or 
in some cases proliferate their offerings to compete for fund flows).  Finally, unrelated 
to performance, FOFs’ growth and popularity may simply be due to the fact that they 
offer (or are perceived as offering) something different than the standard mutual fund. 
 
In addition to these growth trends, we provide an initial overview of relative 
performance and cost structure of FOFs and traditional mutual funds over two distinct 
years, 1996 and 2003.  Further analysis considers the eight-year period from 1996 to 
2003 and includes an examination of the differential impact of FOFs’ management 
                                                                                                                                            
obligations typically related to fee structures.  Common share classes are:  A, depicting funds with 
front-end fees; B, for funds with deferred loads; C, indicating no sales charges, but relatively high 
annual 12b-1 fees.  
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structure and diversification strategies on fund performance.  Additionally, we 
provide a detailed discussion of other unique features of FOFs that influence their 
desirability. 
 
3. Descriptive statistics 
To analyze fund composition, performance and cost structure, we compare our set of 
FOFs to two groups of equity funds including a broad group of equity funds and a 
subset of these funds with the same investment objectives as the sample of FOFs.5  
Table 1 provides descriptive information for the FOFs and the equity fund samples.  
Focusing strictly on the FOFs, first in 1996 and then again in 2003, growth is apparent 
from the number of fund offerings (nearly a ten-fold increase) and the increase in total 
assets.  Further, this growth occurs despite increasing loads. 
 
When compared to the broad equity fund group and the equity subset, FOFs exhibit 
several distinguishing features.  For example, Table 1 shows that FOFs are 
substantially smaller than their equity counterparts, which on a percentage basis could 
contribute to their larger annual total asset growth (approximately 29% annually 
compared to the 11% for equity funds and 12% for the equity subset over 1996 to 
2003).  In addition to performance as a driver for this growth differential, increased 
demand for and flows into FOFs is also a contributing factor.  Table 1 further suggests 
that FOFs hold more funds that invest in smaller companies than the other two equity 
groups, as illustrated by the lower average median market capitalization measure.  
Finally, the average minimum initial purchase is significantly smaller for FOFs 
                                                 
5 The final sample of FOFs used for empirical analyses consists of funds with the following investment 
objectives (as defined by MS): aggressive growth, growth, growth and income, asset allocation, and 
balanced. 
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indicating that the two equity groups are comprised of funds requiring larger initial 
investments, perhaps targeting institutional investors. 
 
When measuring FOFs’ performance it should be noted that FOFs returns are net of 
not only their own asset-based expenses and fees, but also all expenses, fees, and 
loads charged by the individual funds in their portfolio.  Table 1 reveals that FOFs on 
average carry a higher Morningstar rating, which is consistent with FOFs average 
three-year mean return exceeding that of the equity or the equity subset group of 
funds.  These higher returns are accompanied by lower volatility suggesting that 
FOFs’ risk-adjusted performance exceeds that of both traditional equity fund groups. 
 
As indicated in the final section of Table 1, the cost structure of FOFs has changed 
dramatically since 1996.  For example, by 2003 front-end fees and deferred loads had 
more than doubled while 12b-1 fees increased by 32%.  Despite these increases in 
fees and loads, FOFs’ expenses are still below those of the two equity groups.  In 
addition, the expense ratio and turnover for FOFs have decreased from 1.16% to 
0.82% and 72% to 49%, respectively, from 1996 to 2003.  These figures are well 
below the expense ratio and turnover figures for the traditional equity fund groups, 
which have experienced increases in both of these cost categories over the same 
period. 
 
In summary, FOFs differ in size, performance and cost structure when compared to 
traditional equity funds.  Particularly appealing to investors may be the higher returns 
and lower volatility and costs associated with FOFs.  In spite of the added layer of 
fees, FOFs are able to absorb these and in some cases provide enhanced risk-adjusted 
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performance.  To further explore these casual observations, we provide a detailed 
statistical analysis of performance for both the FOFs’ group and the equity subset. 
 
4. Performance evaluation 
4.1.  Performance Analysis 
The FOFs and the equity funds comparisons are based on two common risk-adjusted 
performance measures, which include Jensen’s alpha (α) and the Sharpe ratio.  These 
measures are estimated for each fund over the period 1996-2003.  While the fund 
samples have been matched based on investment objective, we additionally control 
for allocation-based performance differences by estimating modified Jensen’s alphas 
using a multi-factor version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model.  The multi-
benchmark model includes three different equity market factors and one bond market 
factor; large and small capitalization stock indexes, a foreign stock index and a bond 
index.  These benchmarks capture the impact of the funds’ differential holdings of 
large-cap, small-cap, foreign and bond investments.6  The model is specified as 
follows:  
  rpt-rft = α+βpL(rLt-rft)+βpS(rSt-rft)+βpF(rFt-rft)+βpB(rBt-rft)+εpt        (1) 
  where, 
   rpt is the return on the fund being evaluated in period t,   
   rft is the return on the riskless asset in period t (3-month T-bill),  
   βpj is the sensitivity to benchmark j, 
   rjt is the return on the benchmark in period t, 
   L is a large stock index (S&P 500),  
   S is a small stock index (S&P 600),  
   F is a foreign stock index (MSCI World),  
   B is a bond index (Lehman Brother’s LT Govt/Corp. Bond), 
   εpt is the random error. 
 
                                                 
6 This multi-benchmark model is similar to that described in Elton, Gruber, Brown and Goetzmann 
(2003). 
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Jensen’s alpha, the intercept term from the model, provides a measure of abnormal 
performance.  The four indexes (S&P 500, S&P600, MSCI World and Lehman 
Brother’s LT Government/Corporate Bond) are mutually exclusive in their 
constituents and cover the most commonly used benchmarks, thus minimizing the 
potential for benchmark error.   
 
The Sharpe ratio measures risk-adjusted performance using a benchmark based on the 
ex-post capital market line.  It is calculated as follows: 
        (2) pfpp ararSR σ−= /)(
where, 
 
 arp = average monthly fund return7   
 arf  = average monthly risk-free return (3-month T-Bill) 
    = standard deviation of the monthly returns for the fund pσ
This ratio is calculated for each fund over the period 1996-2003. 
For performance comparisons, the equity funds sample is the subset group of all 
equity funds with the same investment objectives (designated by Morningstar) as the 
FOFs’ sample.  Therefore, both the FOFs and equity subset samples include funds 
with the following investment objectives: aggressive growth, growth, growth and 
income, asset allocation and balanced.  Both performance measures are calculated for 
each fund with a performance history of at least one year.  This results in a sample 
consisting of 172 FOFs and 2,369 equity funds for a total of 2,541 funds holding 
distinct investment portfolios.8
 
                                                 
7 For the FOFs, returns are net of asset-based expenses and fees, and all realized expenses, fees, and 
loads of the individual funds in their portfolio.  For the equity fund subset, returns are net of all asset-
based expenses and fees. 
8 In cases where multi-class funds are offered, the final sample includes the share class with the longest 
operating history. 
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Table 2 reports the average alphas and coefficient estimates of the multi-benchmark 
model, and the average Sharpe ratios for FOFs and the equity fund subset.  Also 
included in the table are test statistics comparing the two samples.  Based on the 
performance measures, results indicate that the FOFs perform as well as, or better 
than the equity fund subset.9  The alpha estimates for both samples are negative and 
significantly different from zero, although the Wilcoxon two-sample test statistics 
indicate they are not significantly different from one another.  Still the magnitude of 
the equity funds negative alpha is twice that of the FOFs’ sample.  A comparison of 
the Sharpe ratios provides further support with the FOFs outperforming the equity 
funds subset, and this difference is statistically significant.  Overall, regardless of the 
measure used, the FOFs’ performance compares favorably to the equity fund subset.  
This finding is in contrast to Brown, Goetzmann and Liang’s (2004) hedge fund study 
where the funds of hedge funds significantly underperformed the individual hedge 
funds.  This may be due to the fact that FOFs are not subject to the incentive fees that 
significantly erode the returns for the funds of hedge funds.   
 
4.2.  Model related performance considerations 
As a robustness check we consider whether the multi-benchmark model adequately 
captures potential allocation-based performance differentials.  To address this we 
construct three regressions that include the estimated alphas as the dependent variable, 
while investment objective and asset allocation serve as independent variables.  Table 
3, Panel A presents the specification of these regressions and reports the results.  The 
first regression uses dummy variables for investment objectives and demonstrates that 
                                                 
9 The results are robust to the time period analyzed.  Estimates were also generated for two non-
overlapping subperiods, 1997-1999 and 2000-2002, which represent up-market and down-market 
periods, respectively.  The subperiod results are consistent with the overall results for the entire period 
and thus are not reported separately. 
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except for growth funds, all other fund categories outperformed the aggressive growth 
funds since all of the coefficients are positive and significantly different from zero.10  
The second regression considers asset allocation variables, while the third regression 
includes both asset allocation and investment objective variables.  The results from 
both of these regressions indicate that the asset allocation coefficient estimates are not 
significant.  This provides reasonable evidence that the alpha estimates are not the 
result of systematic asset allocation differences with the multi-benchmark model 
(Equation 1) adequately accounting for the different market factor loadings. 
 
Previous literature documents mixed results regarding the impact of fund specific 
variables like turnover, expense ratio and fund age on performance.11  To address their 
potential impact we analyze three regressions with the estimated alphas as the 
dependent variable and fund specific variables as independent variables along with 
FOFs and investment objective dummy variables.  Panel B of Table 3 presents the 
specification of these regressions and also indicates that turnover, expense ratios and 
fund age negatively impact performance. 
 
After accounting for investment objectives and fund specific variables, the coefficient 
estimate for the FOFs’ dummy variable is not significant.  This is consistent with our 
general findings that FOFs cover their additional layer of fees since their risk-
adjusted, after expense performance is on par with that of the traditional equity funds.  
Despite the insignificant coefficient for the FOFs’ dummy, FOFs are typically 
younger and have lower turnover and expense ratios than the average equity fund.  In 
                                                 
10 The aggressive growth (AG) dummy variable is included in the intercept of the model. 
11 While Malkiel (1993, 1995) and Carhart (1997) document that performance is negatively related to 
portfolio turnover, Grinblatt and Titman (1994) and Wermers (2000) find a positive relationship.  In 
regard to fund age, Malhotra and Mcleod (1997) find expense ratios are negatively related to age, yet 
Prather, Bertin and Henker (2004) find age does not significantly impact performance. 
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light of these qualities, we examine the sample further to establish a systematic 
approach for selecting FOFs. 
 
4.3 Management structure and performance 
Advocates of FOFs hype their ability to provide access to top quality managers and to 
achieve risk reduction through fund manager and fund company diversification.  The 
potential advantage of management diversification is obvious assuming that 
managers’ performance records are not perfectly correlated.  Finance theory would 
suggest that by holding a portfolio of funds with different managers, poor 
performance by one manager can be offset by another’s good performance.  Along 
these lines, Fant and O’Neal (1999) document substantial risk reduction benefits 
associated with diversification across fund managers.  Although a similar 
diversification argument can be made at the fund company level, holding different 
companies’ funds may also expand the range of investment opportunities.  
Additionally, FOFs that invest across different fund companies may provide 
monitoring services.  Theory further suggests that FOFs’ managers, in their capacity 
as monitors, reduce potential inefficiencies arising from agency problems between 
fund managers and fund owners.  Thus, agency costs (the added layer of fees and 
expenses) are borne by investors to compensate FOFs’ managers for the oversight 
function they provide. 
 
Given the relative performance of FOFs, we empirically examine the potential sources 
of gains, such as diversification (fund companies/managers) and/or management 
expertise (monitoring/informational advantages).  As previously reported in Table 1, 
the lower standard deviation of returns reported for FOFs implies diversification 
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benefits.  To consider the alternative explanation of management expertise, the 
following analyses focus on Sharpe ratio comparisons within the FOFs’ sample.12
 
The MS database provides information regarding management structure so that funds 
may be categorized as follows: funds managed by an individual, funds managed by an 
identified team (typically fewer than 4 individuals), or unidentified, team-managed 
funds.  In the FOFs’ sample we are able to identify the management structure for 160 
funds with 60 of the funds being individually managed, 32 managed by identified 
teams and 68 having unidentified team-managers.  If performance is purely due to 
diversification benefits, then management structure should have no impact on our 
results.  Alternatively, if management expertise adds value, then we may observe 
performance differentials. 
 
To report the performance comparisons for these groups, we construct a three-by-
three matrix based upon the different management structures.  Utilizing this matrix 
format, Table 4 reports the Sharpe ratios and significance tests for comparisons of 
management structure within the FOFs’ sample.  The Sharpe ratios and the number of 
funds within each management category are listed along the diagonals of the Table, 
and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistics for comparing managers are listed on the 
off-diagonals.  The average monthly ratio is highest for the funds managed by 
individuals and lowest for the unidentified team-managed funds.  The ratios for the 
two groups of funds with identified managers (individual and team) are 0.0751 and 
0.0484, respectively, and the null hypothesis of equal means cannot be rejected.  The 
                                                 
12 Eling and Schuhmacher (2007) find the Sharpe ratio rankings of fund performance are virtually 
identical to a wide array of other performance measures.  Further, our sample FOFs’ holdings are 
highly diversified with FOFs typically holding an average of 18 traditional funds, and those funds hold 
an average of 170 individual securities. 
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Sharpe ratio for the unidentified team-managed funds however, is 0.0202, resulting in 
the rejection of the null hypothesis of equal means when comparing this group to the 
identified team-managed group. 
 
These results suggest benefits beyond simple manager diversification or company 
diversification as better performance is achieved by those funds that specifically 
designate and identify their managers.  Since identified teams may be directly 
responsible for the FOFs’ performance, their reputations are at stake.  This provides 
the motivation to use their management expertise in selecting fund managers and fund 
companies, as well as evaluating the economy, industry and firms in which the 
selected funds invest.  Thus, we find enhanced performance for these identified team 
managers who provide more than naïve diversification.  In contrast, fund companies 
that offer funds with unidentified managers may be attempting to capitalize on the 
demand for FOFs by creating a product that simply combines their existing funds.  In 
doing so, these FOFs merely offer naïve diversification with no specialized 
management expertise, and their performance is significantly worse. Baer, Kempf and 
Ruenzi (2006) find a negative relationship between team management and fund 
performance, however, they do not differentiate between identified and unidentified 
teams.  In contrast, our stratification based on identification of team managers allows 
us to capture the differential impact of those FOFs putting their names on the line 
versus those that are merely creating a popular product. 
 
To address the benefits of diversification across fund companies, management 
expertise, and/or monitoring that reduces the potential agency conflict, the following 
discussion and analysis compares the performance of FOFs that invest in-family to 
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those that invest out-of-family.  While FOFs investing out-of-family can offer 
diversification at both the manager level and fund company level, funds investing in-
family can only offer diversification at the fund manager level.  Our sample clearly 
demonstrates that FOFs offer diversification across mutual fund managers as only 
three cases exist where a FOFs’ manager has invested in traditional funds solely under 
his/her own management.  Diversification across different fund companies, however, 
is less apparent as 135 of the FOFs invest in-family and only 34 invest outside of the 
fund family. 13
 
Table 5 presents the average monthly Sharpe ratios for comparing the performance of 
the two distinct groups of FOFs.  The average monthly ratio for the in-family group is 
0.1108, which is significantly different from zero and larger than that of the out-of-
family group at -0.0040.  According to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, the 
performance differential between the two groups is statistically significant indicating 
the desirability of FOFs that invest in-family. 
 
Although this finding seems contrary to the notion of diversification and monitoring 
benefits, the dominance of in-family performance may result from asymmetric 
information regarding in-house fund managers.  FOFs that invest in-house may be 
privy to inside information that would not be available to the FOFs’ managers 
investing out-of-family.  Thus the diversification and monitoring benefits of investing 
out-of-family are more than offset by the losses associated with asymmetric 
information, although in most cases investing out-of-family is a function of limited in-
                                                 
13 In-family FOFs are categorized as having the majority of investments in traditional funds offered by 
their own company, while out-of-family FOFs invest in traditional funds outside the FOFs’ company.  
For this part of the analysis, we are able to categorize a total of 169 of the original 172 FOFs in the 
sample.  
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house availability of mutual funds.14  In-family FOFs also have the support of larger 
fund complexes, such that investing in-house could provide certain cost advantages 
not available to outsiders, including full or partial waiver of expenses, fees and 
loads.15  Thus, holding funds through a FOFs’ investment can actually reduce overall 
costs, as Table 1 shows FOFs’ average cost structure is lower than that of traditional 
equity funds.  This finding is consistent with the results of Gaspar, Massa and Matos 
(2006), which document cross-fund subsidization within mutual fund families. 
 
The next analysis considers whether management structure has an impact on 
performance between in-family and out-of-family FOFs.  We are able to identify 
management structure for 129 of the 135 in-family FOFs and 31 of the 34 in the out-
of-family group.  Table 6 contains the Sharpe ratios for both groups classified by 
individual managers, identified team managers and unidentified team managers.  For 
the in-family FOFs, individual, identified-team, and unidentified team managed funds 
have ratios of 0.1067, 0.0416 and 0.0338, respectively.  While this performance 
measure for the individually managed funds is larger than the other groups, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of equal means.  These results suggest that in-family versus 
out-of-family investment decisions are more important than management structure in 
determining FOFs’ performance.  For the 31 funds that invest out-of-family, 15 are 
individually managed, 5 have team-identified structures and 11 are unidentified team 
managed, and their Sharpe ratios are –0.0196, 0.0854 and –0.0503, respectively.16  
                                                 
14 For the out-of-family sample, the families provide on average 19 fund offerings compared to 120 
offerings for the in-family FOFs.  
15 Fund companies may offer this as a marketing tool to encourage predictable flows into the traditional 
funds within the family.  Additionally, fund companies that offer financial advisory services may find it 
more efficient to put smaller investors into FOFs to reduce costs associated with reviewing and 
rebalancing portfolios. 
16 Given the small number of funds within each category, statistical tests of equal means are not 
conducted. 
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Thus, the FOFs that invest out-of-family with unidentified team management 
structures exhibit the worst performance. 
 
A final analysis compares the performance of the FOFs to the equity fund subset.  
Table 7 reports the Sharpe ratios and Jensen’s alphas for both the in-family and out-
of-family FOFs and also for the equity funds.  The comparisons provide evidence that 
the in-family FOFs not only keep pace with the traditional funds, but that they also 
exhibit superior performance (approximately 10% significance level).  By contrast the 
Sharpe ratio for the out-of-family FOFs is significantly below that of the traditional 
funds.  These results support the prior findings that those FOFs investing in-family are 
the preferred choice not only among FOFs, but also among mutual funds in general.17
 
Based on the superior performance of in-family FOFs, the logical extension is to 
increase returns by replicating a FOFs’ portfolio with a hypothetical “do-it-yourself” 
strategy in an attempt to avoid the additional layer of fees and expenses.  In theory, 
replication is possible given that Morningstar provides complete listings of mutual 
funds’ holdings, however, in practice, three potential barriers to implementing of such 
a strategy emerge.  The first is the magnitude of the investment required to replicate a 
FOFs’ portfolio, while the second barrier arises when funds held by the FOFs are 
closed to either additional investment or new investors.  Even for those FOFs that 
invest in open funds not restricted to investor type, minimum initial purchase 
requirements could serve as a third barrier to effective replication.   
 
                                                 
17 Although this study does not correct for survivor bias, we find a 3-year mortality rate of 4.3% for 
FOFs compared to the 5.4% rate that Malkiel (1995) reports for general equity funds.  This suggests 
that the impact of survivor bias is greater for the non-FOFs sample, which would inflate their returns 
relative to the FOFs sample.  Hence, a correction for survivor bias would serve to reinforce our results.  
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Given that FOFs’ allocation is across traditional funds with a wide range of minimum 
initial investments (as little as a zero dollar investment to over $1 million), the 
replication of a FOFs’ portfolio may require large outlays.  For the sample of FOFs 
analyzed in this study, the average median investment required to duplicate a FOFs’ 
holdings is over $500,000 with some funds requiring more than $50 million to 
replicate.  By contrast minimum initial investments for most FOFs are generally low, 
as Table 1 indicates the median minimum initial purchase for the average FOFs is just 
$1,000. 
 
FOFs also offer the investor the opportunity to invest in funds that have been closed to 
new investment.  Prior studies including Zhao (2004), Manakyan and Liano (1997) 
and Smaby and Fizel (1995) have documented that funds typically close to new 
investment after having experienced superior performance and that investors chase the 
returns of funds with past superior performance.  Closed funds frequently cite the 
need to restrict fund flows in order to maintain a successful investment strategy and 
justify their closures based on this argument.  For those investors wishing to purchase 
shares in the pursuit of the superior performance of closed funds, FOFs provide them 
with this opportunity. 
 
Finally, FOFs are able to reduce or eliminate the impact of loads on performance.  
Loads are usually determined on a sliding scale that decreases as a function of dollars 
invested. For the typical load fund, front-end or deferred loads range between zero 
and 5.75% with Table 1 reporting average front-end and deferred loads at 
approximately 1%.  Since FOFs typically invest in large dollar amounts, they can 
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avoid loads altogether and thus achieve cost efficiencies that are unobtainable by 
small-scale investors. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper examines the rapidly growing category of mutual funds known as FOFs, 
which are unique in that they invest in other mutual funds rather than individual 
securities.  These differences allow us to compare the overall performance of FOFs to 
that of traditional mutual funds and examine the potential impact of management 
structure and fund company diversification upon performance.  We also consider the 
feasibility of providing the same FOFs’ benefits through a hypothetical “do-it-
yourself” strategy of investing in multiple mutual funds. 
 
The findings suggest that the rapid growth in FOFs is warranted, since their 
performance compares favorably to that of traditional mutual funds, and they provide 
a cost effective method for diversification.  Our results further indicate that enhanced 
performance can be attributed to diversification across fund managers, management 
expertise and cost efficiencies as opposed to fund company diversification.  
Additionally, FOFs with individual or identified team managers outperform their 
unidentified team-managed counterparts.  Comparing FOFs to traditional equity funds 
with similar investment objectives, we find that a systematic approach of selecting 
FOFs that invest in-family leads to superior performance.  Finally, duplication of a 
FOFs’ investment portfolio on an individual level is virtually impossible, since FOFs 
frequently hold funds with high minimum initial investments, as well as funds closed 
to new investors. 
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Table 1 - Descriptive statistics for FOFs and traditional equity funds   
Portfolio characteristics, performance and cost variables in the years 1996 and 2003 for three groups of mutual funds:  
fund of funds (FOFs), equity funds and a subset of equity funds with the same investment objectives as the  
FOFs (figures are averages unless otherwise noted). 
     Fund of Funds    Equity Funds    Equity Fund Subset 
     1996             2003   1996             2003   1996             2003   
Total Assets    $14.65 (bil) $85.32 (bil)  $1.70 (tril) $3.56 (tril)  $1.14 (tril) $2.50 (tril) 
Number of Funds*   (55)  (526)   (4,103)  (11,011)  (2,138)  (6,492) 
Portfolio Characteristics 
Med. Mkt. Cap. (mil)   $9,008 $14,823  $7,762  $18,785  $10,355 $23,957 
Total Holdings (#)**   NMF  18   139  165   132  170 
Min. Purchase (median)   $1,000 $1,000   $1,000  $1,000   $1,000  $1,000 
Min. Purchase    $3,063 $231,415  $169,349 $916,783  $201,902 $921,190 
Performance 
PE     25.8  17.8   25.4  19.6   25.2  19.4 
σ (3-yr)(%)    8.51  12.38   12.41  19.56   11.49  18.17 
3-yr. Mean Return***   11.49  -0.3   12.9  -2.01   14.64  -3.5 
MS rating (3-yr.)   3.0  3.26   3.03  2.96   3.15  2.97 
Cost Structure 
Front-end Fees (%)   0.49  1.01   1.46  1.11   1.44  1.11 
Deferred Load (%)   0.38  0.86   0.88  0.97   0.83  0.96 
12b-1 Fees) (%)   0.25  0.33   0.37  0.42   0.35  0.41 
Expense Ratio (%)   1.16  0.82   1.54  1.58   1.40  1.45   
Turnover (%)    72  49   84  121   90  170 
* These numbers consider all multi-class funds within each group.  The results presented in the remainder of the paper consider only those funds in each group 
 with distinct investment portfolios.  Thus, the samples used in the performance comparisons consist of 172 FOFs and 2,369 traditional equity funds. 
** For FOFs, the median number of funds held; for equity funds, the average number of securities held 
*** For all funds, returns are net of asset-based expenses and fees.  For the FOFs, the returns are also net of loads assessed by the traditional funds. 
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Table 2 
Performance analysis 
This table includes Jensen’s alphas and beta estimates for the multi-benchmark model and the Sharpe ratios for the 172 FOFs and 2,369 equity funds from 
1996-2003.  For the multi-benchmark model, the estimates for the betas are denoted as: L for the large stock index, S for the small stock index, B for the bond 
index and F for the foreign stock index.  Also included is the Wilcoxon two-sample test statistic comparing the mean coefficient estimates of the FOFs sample 
and the equity fund subset. 
 
Modified Jensen’s α: rpt-rft = α+βpL(rLt-rft)+βpS(rSt-rft)+βpB(rBt-rft)+βpF(rFt-rft)+εpt 
Sharpe ratio:  pfpp ararSR σ−= /)(
 
   FOFs   Equity Fund Subset  t-statistic 
α   -0.0004+  -0.0008+   1.15 
βpL   0.38+   0.62+    -9.74***
βpS   0.19+   0.28+    -0.66 
βpB   0.09+   0.02+    8.65***  
βpF    0.13+   0.04+    9.32***
Sharpe ratio  0.08+   0.07+    2.49***
N   172   2369 
 
coefficients different from zero coefficients different across fund samples 
+++    1% significance  ***  1% significance level 
++      5% significance  **    5% significance level 
+       10% significance  *     10% significance level 
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Table 3  
Analysis of the model: Investment objective, fund composition and characteristics 
This table contains regression model results using Jensen’s alphas as dependent variables.  The independent variables are fund objective dummies 
(AG=aggressive growth, AA=asset allocation, BA=balanced, GR=growth, GI=growth and income), composition (cash, equity, bonds and other) and 
characteristics (turn = turnover, exprat = expense ratio and age). 
 
 
Panel A: Regressions are specified as follows:  
1) ,         2) ,             3)  εiobjba
4
1i
ii ++= ∑
=
α εallocba
4
1i
ii ++= ∑
=
α εallocbiobjba
8
5i
ii
4
1i
ii +++= ∑∑
==
α
      
Dep. Var. Intercepta AA  BA   GR  GI  Cash%  Equity% Bonds%         Other%  
1) α  -0.0020*** 0.0021** 0.0018**   0.0007  0.0036*** 
2) α    0.0085          -0.0125  -0.0094  -0.0061  -0.0087 
3) α    0.0055  0.0035*** 0.0028***   0.0032*** 0.0037*** -0.0127  -0.0095  -0.0062  -0.0089 
 
 
 
Panel B: Regressions are specified as follows:  
1) ,         2) ,             3)  εFOFba 0 ++=α εiobjbFOFba
4
1i
ii0 +++= ∑
=
α εagebexpratbturnbiobjbFOFba 765
4
1i
ii0 ++++++= ∑
=
α
   
Dep. Var. Intercepta  FOF   AA  BA  GR  GI  turn  exprat  age 
1) α  -0.0008*** 0.0004  
2) α  -0.0020*** -0.0002  0.0021** 0.0018** 0.0007  0.0036*** 
3) α  -0.0030  -0.0013  0.0026*** 0.0025*** 0.0014** 0.0040*** -0.0006*** -0.1059*** -0.00003** 
 
a the estimated intercept includes the AG funds.   
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4   
Performance measures for FOFs as a function of management structure 
For the sample of 160 FOFs based on management structure (individual, identified team and unidentified team), the average monthly Sharpe 
ratios are reported along the diagonals with the number of funds in each group in parentheses.  The off-diagonals include the Wilcoxon 
z-statistics and p-values used to compare differences in the Sharpe ratios for individual versus identified team, individual versus unidentified 
team and identified team versus unidentified team. 
 
 
 
   Individual        Identified           Unidentified 
            Team Man.                    Team Man.  
 
Individual  0.0751         z = 1.0288  z = 0.9812 
Manager  (60)         p-value = (0.1518) p-value = (0.1632) 
 
 
Identified     0.0484   z = 2.3091 
Team Management    (32)   p-value = (0.0105) 
 
 
Unidentified        0.0202 
Team Management       (68) 
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Table 5   
Fund company diversification and performance evaluation 
This table includes average monthly Sharpe ratios, standard deviations and ANOVA test statistics.  The  
Wilcoxon signed rank test statistics are also included to compare the performance of 135 FOFs that  
invest in-family to that of the 34 FOFs that invest out-of-family. 
 
        ANOVA test statistics Wilcoxon test statistics 
    Sharpe ratio      St. Dev.   z     p-value        F  p-value N 
In-Family FOFs   0.1108      0.3094   4.16     <0.0001      1.8137  0.0349  135 
Out-of-family FOFs  -0.0040      0.1001 -0.2355    0.8153                34     
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Table 6  
Performance comparisions: In-family versus out-of-family FOFs and management structure 
This table reports Sharpe ratios, standard deviations and test statistics for comparing the 
impact of management structure (individual, identified team, unidentified team) on FOFs 
that invest in-family and FOFs that invest out-of-family. 
 
 
 
Panel A: 129 In-Family FOFs       
    
       
      
      
       
 
 
      
      
    
       
      
  Sharpe ratio St. Dev. t p-value N
Individual Managers (IND) 0.1067 0.2556 2.80 0.0076 45
Identified Team-Managed (IDT) 0.0416 0.1059 2.04 0.0518 27  
Unidentified Team-Managed (UNT) 0.0338 0.1332 1.92 0.0602 57
 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests 
 
      
H z = 0.0582 0:SRIND = SRIDT  H0:SRIND = SRUNT  z = 1.0244 H0:SRIDT = SRUNT  z = 1.1302 
H p-value = 0.4768 
 
a:SRIND > SRIDT  
 
Ha:SRIND > SRUNT  
 
p-value = 0.1528 
 
Ha:SRIDT > SRUNT  
 
p-value = 0.1292 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: 31 Out-of-Family FOFs 
  Sharpe ratio St. Dev. t p-value N
Individual Managers (IND) -0.0196 0.0952 -0.7971 0.4387 15
Identified Team-Managed (IDT) 0.0854 0.0332 5.7531 0.0045 5  
Unidentified Team-Managed (UNT) -0.0503 0.0987 -1.6894 0.1220 11
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Table 7  
Performance comparisons for FOFs and the equity fund subset 
This table compares the performance of the in-family and out-of-family FOFs’ 
performance to that of the equity fund subset using both Sharpe ratio and Jensen’s 
alpha as performance measures and also reports test statistics.  
 
       
  FOFs
Equity Fund 
Subset Wilcoxon Z p-value   
In-family 
Sharpe ratio 0.1108 0.0410 0.9667 0.1668   
  
     
Jensen’s alpha -0.0003 -0.0008 1.2437 
 
0.1068 
 
Out-of-family 
Sharpe ratio 0.0040 0.0410 2.1789 0.0147   
  Jensen’s alpha -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0402 0.4840 
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